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The Lasting Viability of Rasul in the
Wake of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
JOSEPH

R. POPE*

"It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two
contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon
any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence
would 1equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body."
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INTRODUCTION

I recently authored an article 2 dealing with the Supreme Court's ruling
in Rasul v. Bush 3 -a case where the Court determined that federal courts
possessed jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims brought by detainees
held at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba-where I discussed the questionable logic
of that decision and how it arguably expanded federal jurisdiction beyond
the scope of the habeas statute.4 Because Rasul rested exclusively on
statutory grounds, I suggested that Congress act to remedy the Court's error
and proposed several statutory "fixes" to accomplish this.5
Congress did indeed take action following the Rasul decision by
enacting the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), which was signed
into law on December 30, 2005 and enacted on January 6, 2006.6
Specifically, section 1005(e)(1) of the Act amends the federal habeas
corpus statute 7 to read:
(e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department
of Defense at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the United States or its
agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the
Department of Defense of an alien at Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba, who(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in accordance with the procedures set
forth in section 1005(e) of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant.8

2.
Joseph R. Pope, Opening the Floodgates: Rasul v. Bush and the Federal
Court's New World-Wide HabeasCorpus Jurisdiction,26 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 331 (2006).
3.
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
4.
Pope, supra note 2.
5.
Id.
6.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2006)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)) [hereinafter DTA].
7.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
8.
DTA § 1005(e)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
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The Act also provides that "the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the validity of any final decision" made by Combatant Status Review
Tribunals ("CSRTs") 9 and military commissions' established by the
Department of Defense. Furthermore, the scope of review is limited to
consideration of "whether the final decision was consistent with the
standards and procedures" specified by the Department of Defense, and "to
the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable,
whether the use of such standards and procedures to reach the final decision
is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."'"
After Rasul was decided, but prior to the enactment of the DTA,
attorneys had filed more than a dozen habeas corpus petitions on behalf of
sixty detainees in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 12 One of those cases, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 13 made its way to
and was decided by the United States Supreme Court. During the course of
the litigation, the Government filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. As authority for its position, the Government cited the DTA
and claimed the statute stripped the Court of jurisdiction over pending
cases. However, the Court denied the motion, finding that the DTA did not
apply to habeas cases currently pending before it or any other federal court.
This article seeks to summarize those portions of the DTA that affect
Rasul and contends that Congress failed to abrogate its broad holding,
leaving it viable precedent for habeas petitions filed by detainees held in
places other than Guantinamo Bay. This article also seeks to summarize

9. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(A). The statute also directs that not later than 180 days after its
enactment the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the Senate Armed Services Committee
and the Judiciary Committee as well as the Armed Services Committee and the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives a report establishing procedures that the CSRTs
must utilize in determining whether to detain an alien held in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, and in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Id.§ 1005(a)(1).
10. Id. § 1005(e)(3)(A). Review of decisions of military commissions "shall be as
of right" for those aliens sentenced in "a capital case" or "to a term of imprisonment of 10
years or more" and "shall be at the discretion of the [Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit]" in "any other case." Id. § 1005(e)(3)(B). The Act further limits the
jurisdiction vested in the Court to appeals "brought by or one behalf of an alien" who was
detained at Guantinamo Bay "at the time of the [military commission] proceedings" and
"for whom a final decision has been rendered." Id.§ 1005(e)(3)(C).
11.
DTA § 1005(e)(3)(D), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
12. See, e.g., In re Guantinamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D. D.C.
2005); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005).
13.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct.
622 (U.S. Nov. 7,2005) (No. 05-184).
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briefly the jurisdictional issues raised
in the Hamdan litigation, which
4
directly impact Rasul and the DTA.1
Part II of this article will summarize the Rasul decision and point out
many negative implications flowing from its logic. Part III will summarize
the federal jurisdictional portion of the DTA, its impact on Rasul, and will
explain how the statute fails to remediate adequately the effects of its
holding. Part IV will explore the DTA in the context of the Hamdan
litigation. Specifically, this article will examine the federal jurisdiction
questions raised in that litigation. Ultimately, this article opines that
Rasul's imperfect holding opened a Pandora's box Congress has failed to
close, leaving a great deal of uncertainty in an area where certainty is
needed. The tangled web created by Rasul is a perfect example supporting
the proposition that federal courts should not seek to extend their
jurisdiction beyond what is expressly sanctioned by constitution and
statute.1 5 Only confusion and mischief results whenever that limited
jurisdiction is expanded by judicial fiat. In addition, this article points out
that Congress may yet amend the habeas statute to more fully remediate the
infirmities caused by Rasul.
II.
A.

THE "NARROW" RASUL V. BUSH DECISION
AND ITS BROAD IMPLICATIONS

THE RASUL DECISION

In the landmark case of Rasul v. Bush, 16 decided in 2004, the United
States Supreme Court held that federal courts possess the power to hear
habeas corpus petitions brought by detainees held at Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba.17 The case decided the "narrow" issue of "whether the habeas statute
confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of
14. Hamdan also dispensed with several other issues beyond the scope of this
article. In its opinion, the Hamdan Court determined that abstention was inappropriate in the
matter. The Court also found that the military commissions created by the Bush
administration were not authorized by congressional act. Furthermore, the Court determined
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did apply to the Guanthnamo detainees.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
15. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
16. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Rasul sets forth the Court's decision in two cases that
were consolidated by the Court and argued together: Rasul v. Bush (No. 03-334) and Al
Odah v. United States (No. 03-343).
17.
The Rasul petitioners were foreign nationals who were captured during United
States military operations in Afghanistan. The petitioners included four British and
Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti nationals. Brief for the Respondents at 9, Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The petitioners were later transported to a military detention
center known as Camp Delta located at Guandtnamo Bay, Cuba. Id.
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aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and
exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty.' ,,18
Although there was a paucity of precedent dealing with this issue, the
primary source of authority, Johnson v. Eisentrager,'9 concluded that a
foreign national held in territory outside the United States could not petition
a federal court for habeas review.20 Eisentrager is a World War II case
involving twenty-one German nationals who were captured by the United
States in China. 21 The men were accused of assisting the Japanese forces
and were accordingly tried by a United States military tribunal.2 2 They
were then transported back to Germany, which was still under allied
occupation, in order to serve their sentences.2 3 Subsequent to returning to
Germany, the men filed petitions in the Untied States District Court for the
District of Columbia for habeas corpus review of their detentions.2 4 The
District Court dismissed their petitions 25 but was reversed on constitutional
grounds by the Court of Appeals.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed finding that "[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends
[the right of habeas relief to an alien held outside the territory of the United
States], nor does anything in our statutes. 27 In so deciding, the Court
based its decision on a territorial predicate saying that "these prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is
sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their
punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the
18.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475. In addition to the many nettlesome and complicated
legal questions decided in the case, it also had many ethical and human rights implications.
Prior to the disposition of the case, many domestic and international human rights
organizations and scholars had roundly criticized the entire United States detention program
and called on the federal judiciary to review its legality. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross
Criticizes Indefinite Detentions in Guantnamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al;
Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantinamo Bay: The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "LegalBlack Hole," HUM. RTs. BRIEF (Ctr. for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Washington, D.C.), 2003, at 2. For a more thorough
discussion of the political context of the Rasul decision, see Pope, supra note 2, at 337.
19.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
20.
Id.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 765.
Id.at 766.
Id.
Id.at 767.

Johnson, 339 U.S. at 767.
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'dsub nom. Johnson

v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The Court of Appeals found that the German detainees
were entitled to the writ of habeas corpus as a substantive Constitutional right. The Court
argued that the detainees fell within the "any person" language found in the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 963-65.
27.

Johnson, 339 U.S. at 768.
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United States. 2 8 Simply stated, the EisentragerCourt found that so long
as foreign nationals were held outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, they were precluded from filing habeas petitions in a court of
the United States.29
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court distinguished Eisentrager,noting
the
Rasul detainees were "differently situated" from the Eisentrager
that
prisoners in that (1) they were not nationals of a country at war with the
United States; (2) they deny that they were "engaged in or plotted acts of
aggressions against the United States"; (3) they had not been granted access
to a tribunal, military or otherwise; and (4) they were imprisoned in
territory over which the United States exercises "exclusive jurisdiction and
control" though not ultimate sovereignty. 30 The Court then limited
Eisentrager, finding that it was not controlling as to whether the habeas
corpus statute applied to the Rasul detainees. 31 Rather, the Court
characterized Eisentrager as a case considering the constitutional
parameters of habeas corpus and not the statutory question that was
presented in Rasul. 32 In fact, the Rasul court found that the issue of
whether the habeas statute applied to the claims of foreign nationals held
outside the United States was never before the Eisentragercourt. 33 In SUM,
the court found that the habeas statute provided the federal courts with the
authority to entertain habeas petitions filed by Guantdinamo detainees.
In a biting dissent,34 Justice Scalia argued that the Rasul majority had
done great violence both to the habeas statute and to the Eisentrager
decision.3 5 Scalia noted that the plain text of the habeas statute would only
allow a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus " 'within their respective
Id. at 778.
28.
29.
The statutory "predicate" of Eisentrageris found in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S.
188 (1948). Ahrens was also decided during World War II and involved the habeas petitions
brought by 120 German citizens at Ellis Island, New York. Id. at 189. In Ahrens, the Court
construed the habeas corpus statute as requiring that a detainee be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the district court issuing the writ for the writ to have effect. Id. at 192.
30.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 475.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 476-77. For a more thorough treatment of the Rasul v. Bush decision, see
33.
Pope, supra note 2, at 348-51. For a different perspective on Rasul's logic, see Joseph T.
Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens's Influence from World
War II to the War on Terror,92 VA. L. REV. 501 (2006). There, Professor Thai synthesizes
the cases from the view of Justice Stevens who drafted the dissent in Ahrens while working
for Justice Wiley B. Rutledge. Id.
The dissent was joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Rasul,
34.
542 U.S. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy agreed with the jurisdictional
analysis of the dissent but concurred in the judgment on other grounds. Id. at 485 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35.
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jurisdictions.' ,,36 Scalia also argued that the Eisentrager court did pass
judgment on whether the habeas statute granted jurisdiction over the claims
of foreign nationals held outside the United States. 37 He asserted that the
brevity of the Eisentrager court's analysis signified that it was nothing
more than an axiomatic proposition that the statute failed to reach the
Eisentrager detainees.38
Accordingly, in his view, the Court had
completely recast precedent in order to reach a more palatable result while
at the same time appearing to give due deference to precedent. 39 This
jurisprudence,
he argued, was an example of "judicial adventurism of the
'4 °
worst sort.
B.

RASUL'S IMPLICATIONS

The Rasul opinion abrogated the principle that the physical presence
of a detainee within the territorial jurisdiction of a district court is a
necessary jurisdictional requirement. 41 Accordingly, a federal district court
could issue the writ of habeas corpus "to the four comers of the earth" and
any prisoner held by the United States during a time of war could petition
the court for a writ of habeas corpus. 42 To ameliorate this effect the Court

attempted to restrict habeas jurisdiction to only those territories over which
the United States exercised jurisdiction and control.43 However, this

"restriction" is really no restriction at all because any territory where the
United States holds military detainees will necessarily be a territory over
which it exercises jurisdiction and control. 44 As a result, "[f]rom this point
forward, federal courts will entertain petitions from... prisoners, and others
like them around the world, challenging actions and events far
"45
away ....
The jurisdictional expansion also serves to interfere with the military's
ability to wage war. It seems axiomatic that one of the chief tools enabling

36.
Id. at 466 (majority opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)) (emphasis added).
37.
Id. at 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38.
Id.at 491.
39.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40.
Id.at 506.
41.
Oddly enough, on the same day that the Court released Rasul, the Court
announced its decision in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), which considered a
habeas challenge brought by a detainee held in the United States. There, the Court held that
federal courts could only issue the writ of habeas corpus to "the warden of the facility where
the prisoner is being held" rather than "some other remote supervisory official." Id. at 435.
The Court also held that the detainee could only file his petition in the district of his
confinement. Id.
42.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Id.at 471.
44. Id.
45.
Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a nation to wage war and subdue its enemies is the ability to capture and
detain enemy fighters. " 'Such detention serves the vital military objectives
of preventing captured combatants from rejoining the conflict and gathering
intelligence to further the overall war effort and prevent additional attacks.
The military's authority to capture and detain such combatants is both wellestablished and time honored.' ,46
The Rasul decision also created an exception to the "immediate
custody" rule announced in Padilla v. Rumsfeld.4 Padilla limits a district
court's ability to issue writs of habeas corpus in the domestic context to
" 'some person who has immediate custody of the party detained.' ,48 Under
the regime created by Rasul, a district court can issue the writ upon any
executive official having a supervisory connection to the detainee's
immediate custodian, so long as the official is within the long-arm
jurisdiction of that court. Therefore, a foreign detainee would be permitted
to name the President, the Secretary of Defense, or any other executive
official with some supervisory control over the detainee's custodian.
Furthermore, because every district court would have jurisdiction over
those officials, the detainee could file his petition in any court of his
choosing.

HI.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND THE ADOPTION OF THE

DTA

In response to the Rasul decision, Congress took action to abrogate its
holding by enacting § 1005(e)(1). The first incarnation of § 1005(e)(1), the
Graham-Kyl-Chambliss Amendment, 49 contained two provisions: (1) a
section stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed
by Guantdinamo detainees; and (2) a provision vesting the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to consider appeals
from CSRTs. 50 The amendment also contained language in § 1005(h)(2)
stating that both provisions would apply to cases "pending on or after the
52
51
date of the enactment of this Act., The Senate passed the bill as written
over the objection of Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), who complained that the
46.
Brief for the Respondents at 10, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (citing
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,30-31,
n. 8 (1942)). See also Pope, supra note 2, at 356-57.

542 U.S. 426 (2004).
47.
Id. at 435 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 547 (1885)).
48.
151 CONG. REC. S12,655 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (S.Amend. 2515). (The
49.
Amendment was named after Senators Lyndsey Graham (R-SC), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA)).
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
Id.at S12,667. (The bill was passed on November 10, 2005, by a 49-42 vote,
52.
mainly along party lines.).
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bill would' 53"eliminate jurisdiction already accepted by the Supreme Court in

Hamdan. ,

Not to be deterred, just four days later Senator Levin introduced a
competing bill addressing the "problem . . . with the first Graham
amendment, 5 4 which he saw as stripping "all the courts, including the
Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over pending cases. 55 To this effect,
Senator Levin asserted that his amendment would "not strip the courts of
jurisdiction over those cases. For instance, the Supreme Court jurisdiction
in Hamdan is not affected., 56 Senator Levin later reiterated his argument
saying:
The habeas prohibition in the [first] Graham amendment
applied retroactively to all pending cases-this would have
the effect of stripping the Federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over all pending case[s],
including the Hamdan case.
The Graham-Levin-Kyl
amendment would not apply the habeas prohibition in
paragraph (1) to pending cases. . . .The approach in this
amendment preserves comity between the judiciary and
legislative branches. It avoids repeating the unfortunate
precedent in Ex parte McCardle, in which Congress
intervened to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over a
case which was pending before that Court.57
Soon after Senator Levin introduced his substitute bill, the Bush
administration began pressuring members of the Senate to reject this new
measure; however, those efforts failed.58
On November 15, 2005, the Senate formally adopted the new bill,
which became known as the Graham-Levin-Kyl amendment.5 9 The new §
53.
151 CONG. REc. S 12,664 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin).
54.
151 CONG. REc. S 12,755 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin).
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
151 CONG. REc. S12,802 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin).
Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) agreed with Senator Levin's conclusion saying:
I agree with Senator Levin that his amendment does not divest the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear the pending case of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld. I believe the effective date provision of the amendment is
properly understood to leave pending Supreme Court cases unaffected.
It would be highly irregular for the Congress to interfere in the work of
the Supreme Court in this fashion, and the amendment should not be
read to do so.
151 CONG. REc. S12,803 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Reid).
58.
See Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 8 n.3,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

1005(e) and 1005(e)(2) retained their original language, which stated "no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" any
habeas application or any other action that "relat[es] to any aspect of the
detention" of an alien held at Guantdnamo Bay. 60 However, Senator
Levin's modification to § 1005(h)(1) provided that the section "take[s]
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. ' 61 Congress did, however,

retain the language of § 1005(h)(2), giving the Act immediate effect as to
§ 1005(e)(2) and (3)-the CSRT provisions.6 2 The amendment proceeded
to Conference, where, against pressure from the Administration 63 and a
competing House proposal seeking to insert the original retroactive
application language, 64 the provision won approval.65
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate went on to pass the
DTA, which included the Graham-Levin-Kyl amendment, as it appeared in
two separate provisions. The DTA was first incorporated in the final
version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006,66 passed
by the Senate on December 21, 2005, and signed by President Bush on
December 30, 2005. The DTA was also a part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,67 passed by the Senate on
December 21, 2005, and signed by the President on January 6, 2006. After
passage of the DTA, a co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Kyl, inserted
language into the Congressional Record, arguing that the DTA completely
"extinguish[es] one type of action-all of the actions now in the courts59.
151 CONG.REc. S12,803 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (The bill passed the Senate
by a vote of 84-14.).
60.
DTA § 1005 (e)(l), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
61.
Id.§ 1005 (h)(l).
62. Id.§ 100(h)(2). The language of(h)(2) provides that subsections 1005(e)(2) and
(3) shall apply to all cases "pending on or after" the date of enactment. Id.
63.
151 CONG. REc. S 14,258 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin).
64.
Id.
65.
In order to further clarify the legislative intent of section 1005(h)(1), Senator

Levin stated:
The jurisdiction-stripping provision in the Graham amendment initially
approved by the Senate over my objections would have applied
retroactively to all pending cases in federal court-stripping the courts
of jurisdiction to consider pending cases, including the Hamdan case
now pending in the Supreme Court. The revised amendment ...does
not apply to or alter any habeas case pending in the courts at the time of
enactment. The conference report retains the same effective date as the
Senate bill, thereby adopting the Senate position that this provision will
not strip the courts ofjurisdiction in pending cases.

Press Release, Levin Statement on Conference Agreement on Treatment of Detainees, Dec.
16, 2005, at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfin?id=249898.
66.
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
67. Pub. L.No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136.
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and create[s] in their place68a very limited judicial review of certain military
administrative decisions."
IV.

HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD

After Rasul was decided, but before the DTA was enacted, more than
a dozen habeas petitions were filed on behalf of over sixty of the more than
five hundred Guantdnamo detainees. 69 Among them was a case filed by
Salim Ahmed Hamdan.7 ° Hamdan was alleged to have served as a
bodyguard and driver of Osama Bin Laden. 71 Hamdan argued that the
72
military commission rules and procedures established by the President
were inconsistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and
that the protections of the Geneva Convention applied to him. 73 The district
court agreed with Hamdan, finding that the President's order violated the
UCMJ and that he was indeed entitled to protection under the Geneva
Conventions.7 4 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding the individual rights of the Geneva Conventions were not
"judicially enforceable" and the military commissions qualified as
"competent tribunals" within the meaning of the UCMJ's regulations

68.
151 CONG. REc. S14,263 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
Senator Kyl began his statement by saying, "I would like to say a few words about the nowcompleted National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, and in particular section
1405 of that act, which expels lawsuits brought by enemy combatants from United States
courts." Id. at S14,260.
CRS Report for Congress, Guantanamo Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges
69.
in Federal Court, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33180.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
70.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
71.
Id.
72.
The President had ordered that certain detainees captured during the War on
Terrorism be held at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba, and set up specific provisions for their
treatment. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. § 9.1 (2005). The Department of Defense has implemented the
President's Military Order of November 13, 2001 with a series of Military Commission
Orders, Instructions, and other documents. See generally Department of Defense, Military
Commissions, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/comnissions.html (providing extensive
links to background materials on the Military Commissions). The Secretary of Defense may
designate an "Appointing Authority" to issue orders establishing and regulating military
commissions. Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), 32 C.F.R. § 9.2 (2005),
Secretary
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf.
Rumsfeld designated John D. Altenburg, Jr. as Appointing Authority. Press Release,
Department of Defense, Appointing Authority Decision Made (Dec. 30, 2003) at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0820.html.
73.
Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
Id. at 173-74.
74.
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implementing the Conventions. 75 Hamdan then sought Supreme Court
review, and certiorari was granted on November 7, 2005.76
On January 12, 2006, the Government filed its motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction,7 7 arguing because "the Detainee Treatment Act in plain
terms removes the Court's jurisdiction to hear this action, the Court should
dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction or vacate with instructions for the
lower courts to dismiss, or, at a minimum, dismiss the writ as improvidently
granted. 78 In the Government's view, newly enacted § 1005(h)(1)
"explicitly provides-without reservation-that" it "shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act., 79 Hamdan challenged this contention
claiming "[t]he text, drafting history, and legislative history of the DTA
demonstrate that Congress intended to preserve jurisdiction over pending
actions, including particularly this case.,, 80 Hamdan also objected to the
Government's theory on constitutional grounds, arguing that allowing
Congress to strip the Court of appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases raises
"grave questions" of the efficacy of the writ itself.81 The Supreme Court
postponed its ruling on the Government's motion pending arguments on the
merits. 82
After oral argument and upon considering the Government's position,
the Court denied the motion to dismiss finding the DTA did not divest it of
jurisdiction as to pending cases.83 Although the Court summarized the
constitutional issues raised by Hamdan,84 it found it unnecessary to reach
them 85 and instead grounded
its analysis in "[o]rdinary principles of
86
statutory construction.,
In its analysis the Court found the relevant principle of statutory
construction is that "a negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion
of language from one statutory provision that is included in other provisions
of the same statute."8 7 Keeping that principle in mind, the Court pointed
out that § 1005(h)(1), which applied to subsection (e)(1), stated the
75. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
76. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (No. 05-184).
77. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
78.
Id.at 3.
79. DTA § 1005(h)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
80.
Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 2, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
81.
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2763-64.
82. Id. at 2762.
83. Id. at 2762-63.
84. Id. at 2763-64.
85. Id.at 2764.
86. Id.
87.
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2765.
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88
provision "take[s] effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.",
However, § 1005(h)(2), which applied to subsections (e)(2) and (3),
specifically stated those provisions were given effect as to cases pending on
or after enactment of the DTA. 89 Furthermore, the Court noted that in its
original form the Act specified that (e)(1) was to apply to pending cases. 9°
However, that language was removed in favor of the approach presented in
the Graham-Levin-Kyl amendment, which was intended to make (e)(1)
effective on the date of enactment without retroactive application to
pending cases. 9' Accordingly, the Court found that the omission of
language in (h)(1) specifying that (e)(1) applied to pending cases suggested
that Congress's intention was not to divest it of jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the Hamdan case.92

V.

THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
IN THE WAR ON TERROR

After Rasul, the federal judiciary was endowed with expansive
territorial jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought by prisoners
captured during the course of the war on terrorism. 93 This jurisdiction
allowed courts to entertain petitions brought by detainees so long as the
United States exercised jurisdiction and control over the area in which the
prisoner was held.9 4 The adoption of the DTA clipped the sails of this
expansive power by divesting the federal judiciary of habeas jurisdiction95
over petitions brought by detainees held at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.
However, Congress failed to address the broader implications of Rasul,
which would allow federal courts to entertain habeas petitions brought by
detainees held in other theaters of the conflict.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan had the effect of lessening
the impact of the jurisdiction-stripping feature of the DTA.96 Specifically,
because Congress was not explicit as to the retroactive application of the
Act, the Court was not persuaded by the Government's arguments that the
88.
DTA § 1005(h)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
89.
Id. § 1005(h)(2).
90.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749. See also supra Part 1II.
91.
DTA § 1005(h)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). See also supra Part Ill.
92.
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2769. The Court went on to hold that Congress had not
provided the President with the authority to convene military tribunals, that Common Article
III of the Geneva Convention applied to Hamdan's detention, and that the procedures
established for use in the military tribunals did not comport with the mandates of the UCMJ.
Id.
93.
See Pope, supra note 2. See also supraPart II. B.
94.
See Pope, supra note 2. See also supra Part II. B.
95.
See supra Part Il1.
96.
See supra Part IV.
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federal courts were somehow stripped of jurisdiction to hear pending
habeas petitions brought by the detainees.9 7
To be sure, the Rasul decision cast its broad shadow over the federal
judiciary and the war on terrorism. As was previously argued, this
expansion is unprecedented and dangerously intrudes upon the ability of the
executive to conduct war and provides foreign held detainees with greater
access to the federal courts than domestically held prisoners. Even though
the present administration is vastly unpopular and has been criticized from
all sides concerning its management of the war on terrorism and its
treatment of foreign held detainees, the political process is the venue where
these issues should be resolved, not the federal courts. The judicial scrutiny
the military must now deal with, as it captures and detains suspected
terrorists on foreign soil, is certainly an impediment to its mission, and
Congress has failed to take the appropriate steps to remove this roadblock.
Because Congress has expressed its desire to abrogate Rasul, it should
act quickly and adopt more comprehensive legislation to ameliorate Rasul's
broader implications. Simply, Congress could draft legislation stripping the
federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over all detainees captured and held in
territories outside the United States. As it now stands, the military may
only escape civilian judicial review by holding detainees at Guantinamo
Bay, Cuba. Congress' attempt to designate Guantdnamo as the one region
over which federal habeas jurisdiction does not extend is inadequate as the
nation attempts to wage, what has been described as, a "world-wide" war
on terrorism.

97.

See supra Part IV.

